Children and adults commonly produce more generic noun phrases (e.g., birds fly) about animals than artifacts. This may reflect differences in participants' generic knowledge about specific animals/artifacts (e.g., dogs/chairs), or it may reflect a more general distinction. To test this, the current experiments asked adults and preschoolers to generate properties about novel animals and artifacts (Experiment 1: real animals/artifacts; Experiments 2 and 3: matched pairs of maximally similar, novel animals/artifacts). Data demonstrate that even without prior knowledge about these items, the likelihood of producing a generic is significantly greater for animals than artifacts. These results leave open the question of whether this pattern is the product of experience and learned associations or instead a set of early-developing theories about animals and artifacts.
Introduction
Generic noun phrases (e.g., birds fly) have been hypothesized to ''Provide a window onto human concepts" (Gelman & Tardif, 1998, p. 215) . By referring to a category as an abstract whole (birds in general as opposed to any particular bird or birds), generics express generalizations about shared properties of category members. Research demonstrates that both children and adults produce significantly more generics for categories within the domain of animals than for those within the domain of artifacts (e.g., Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008; Gelman & Tardif, 1998; Goldin-Meadow, Gelman, & Mylander, 2005) . However, why this pattern is found is unclear.
Some have proposed that the animacy bias in generics may reflect a broad differentiation between animal and artifact concepts. For example, animal concepts are more likely to be richly structured and essentialized than artifact concepts (e.g., Gelman, 2003) . On this view, the greater proportion of generics in conversation regarding animals may reflect fundamental differences in how these concepts are structured. However, one alternative hypothesis is that this bias may instead reflect lower-level differences in children's familiarity with or generic knowledge base about the particular animal versus artifact categories being discussed (e.g., dogs versus chairs): children may simply know more generic information about specific, basic-level animal kinds than about specific, basic-level artifact kinds. For example, they may have learned numerous generic properties of dogs (e.g., dogs have fur, four legs, cold noses; dogs bark, wag their tails, dig for bones, retrieve sticks) but few generic properties of chairs (e.g., chairs are for sitting; chairs have legs and a seat). The current experiments aim to test the second hypothesis by examining how adults and young children talk about novel animals and artifacts for which they have equivalent knowledge.
